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A RENAISSANCE YEAR FOR OIL AND GAS
JURISPRUDENCE: THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
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INTRODUCTION

With the renaissance of onshore oil and gas activity in the United
States ranging from the Bakken Field in North Dakota and Montana;
to the Marcellus Field underlying portions of Maryland, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; to the Barnett and Eagle Ford
Fields of north and south Texas respectively, it is not surprising that
there is renewed oil- and gas-related litigation. The 2010-2011 term
of the Texas Supreme Court was particularly active in deciding oil and
gas cases or cases that have a direct impact on oil and gas operations.
One has to look back to 1923, when the Texas Supreme Court issued
several significant oil and gas decisions on the same day, to find a year
in which more oil and gas decisions were handed down.' This Article
will explore those decisions, along with a single Fifth Circuit opinion,
in an attempt to explain their impact on oil and gas jurisprudence. 2
II.

A.

CONSERVATION REGULATION

Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury
Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC

In Texas Rice Land Partners,Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,

LLC, the Court overturned a long-standing practice of the Railroad
Commission regarding its certification of pipelines as common carriers
that would give such common carriers the power of eminent domain.3
The case involved a clash of two very significant public policy issues;
the "property rights" movement, which seeks to restrict the ability of
governmental entities and governmental-licensed entities to exercise
the power of eminent domain; and the "drill-baby-drill" movement,
whereby domestic energy and oil and gas production is to be encouraged. 4 Denbury Green applied to the Railroad Commission for a
permit to operate a carbon dioxide pipeline that would carry carbon

1. See, e.g., Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W. 296 (Tex. 1923); Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923).
2. The Author specifically omits from this Article two Texas Supreme Court
opinions because the firm of which he is counsel has, and continues to represent Exxon Corp. in these matters. These cases are Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.,
331 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010) and Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d
194 (Tex. 2011).
3. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 54 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 1732, 2011 WL 3796574, at *3 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
4. A good example of the judicial embracing of the "drill baby drill" movement is
Justice Willett's concurring opinion in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 26-42 (Tex. 2008) (Willett, J., concurring).
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dioxide from a field in Mississippi, which Denbury Green operated, to
various oil fields in Brazoria and Galveston County for the purpose of
engaging in tertiary recovery projects that would lead to greater production of oil.s Denbury Green filed a Form T-4 that the Railroad
Commission had used for many years in its role as the permitting
agency for intrastate pipelines. Denbury Green checked the box stating it would be operated as a "common carrier" rather than as a "private line" and further indicated that it would transport carbon dioxide
"owned by others, but transported for a fee." 6 Denbury Green also
sent a letter to the Commission noting it would accept the provisions
of Chapter 111 of the Natural Resources Code, which define the requirements to achieve common carrier status and also impose requirements on the operations of a common carrier pipeline.' Eight days
after the application and letter were filed, the Commission issued the
permit for the transportation of carbon dioxide through a common
carrier pipeline.'
One of the benefits of achieving common carrier status is the statutory grant of the power of eminent domain to such entities.9 Texas
Rice owned the surface estate under which Denbury Green intended
to place the pipeline. When Denbury Green employees attempted to
enter Texas Rice's land to survey it for the purpose of either purchasing or condemning a portion of the surface estate for pipeline right-ofway purposes, Texas Rice denied entry. Denbury Green then sought
an injunction to prevent the interference. The trial court found that
Denbury Green was a "common carrier" pipeline and thus had the
power of eminent domain, which gave it the ancillary right to enter
upon the surface estate in order to further that power. 10 It thus permanently enjoined Texas Rice from interfering with Denbury Green's
right to enter and survey the lands in question.
The court of appeals had no problem in affirming the district court's
judgment based on two reasonably simple and non-controversial principles: (1) the determination of whether a pipeline company is a common carrier is a question of law; 1 and (2) substantial deference is to
be given to Railroad Commission decisions in areas of its expertise. 1 2
As this Author has stated elsewhere, the Form T-4 and the letter com5. Denbury, 2011 WL 3796574, at *1.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.002(6); 111.011-.025 (West
2011 & Supp. 2011).
8. Denbury, 2011 WL 3796574, at *2.
9. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a) (West 2011).
10. Denbury, 2011 WL 3796574, at *2 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 111.002(6) (West 2011) for the statutory definition of a "common carrier").
11. See Vardeman v. Mustang Pipeline Co., 51 S.W.3d 308, 310, 312 (Tex. App.Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
12. State v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 1994); Vardeman, 51 S.W.3d at 312; see also BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW
OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 24.06 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing the extent to which
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mitting the permit applicant to operate as a common carrier had, prior
to the Texas Supreme Court's opinion, been given preclusive effect on
judicial review of the Commission's permit decision.1 3 In a dissenting
opinion, however, Justice Gaultney rejected the notion that checking
the boxes and filing the letter precluded effective judicial review of
what he considered to be factual issues relating to Denbury Green's
compliance with the requirements of being classified as a common
carrier.' 4 He found within Denbury Green's application evidence that
the pipeline would be solely used by Denbury Green to transport
Denbury Green's carbon dioxide. This raised factual questions as to
whether the common carrier decision was consistent with the constitutional requirement that prohibits the taking of private property for
private, and not public, use."
It was the dissenting justice's theme that the majority opinion
adopted. The Court was, in essence, challenging the principle that
once the Railroad Commission makes a determination that a pipeline
company is entitled to common carrier status, judicial review is essentially precluded. As Justice Willett stated for a unanimous court,
"Unadorned assertions of public use are constitutionally insufficient." 6 Instead of the Commission's decision being given preclusive
effect, or even deferential effect, the Court determined that where the
Legislature has delegated to private entities the right of eminent domain, such "authority is subject to special scrutiny by the courts.""
That strict scrutiny entails two related principles: (1) strict compliance
with the statutory requirements is required; and (2) any doubt as to
the scope of the grant of the power is to be strictly construed in favor
of the landowner and against the private entity exercising the power
of eminent domain.' 8
The Court debunked the notion that the filings with the Railroad
Commission are to be given preclusive or conclusive effect. While not
disagreeing with the principle that the question of whether a use is a
public use is a question of law for the court, the Court did not find
that the Legislature intended to give the Railroad Commission the
courts give deference to agency adjudicatory decisions along with agency interpretations of statutes and their own rules).
13. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 12, § 25.06 at 25-134 to 25-135.
14. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd., v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC, 296
S.W.3d 877, 881-83 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009) (Gaultney, J., dissenting), rev'd, 54
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1732, 2011 WL 3796574 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
15. Id. at 883 (citing Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1962)); see also
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a).
16. Denbury, 2011 WL 3796574, at *1.
17. Id. at *3.
18. Id. (citing State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 65 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Tex. 2001),
Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 309 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. 1958)). There is
language in Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 105 (1992) that supports treating governmental regulation impacting private
property rights with a heightened level of scrutiny.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss3/21
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V18.I3.20

4

Kramer: Texas

2012]

TEXAS

631

final determination of whether or not a permit applicant was entitled
to common carrier status.19 The seemingly ministerial process by
which the Commission operated did not reflect the requirement that
in order for the eminent domain authority to be legitimately delegated
by the Commission to a private entity, the Commission needed to insure that the proposed exercise of that power was for a public, not a
private, use.20
In order to comply with the constitutional mandate of being for a
public use, the common carrier must show that its operations will
serve a public purpose, which, as a matter of law, does not include the
transportation of company-owned substances over a company-owned
pipeline for use in a company-owned tertiary recovery project. 21 The
Court rejected Denbury Green's claim that by agreeing to be a common carrier and accepting products in the pipeline owned by third
parties, it has complied with the statutory and constitutional requirements. The Court gave a somewhat convoluted reading of the statute
to conclude that merely making the pipeline available for third-party
use does not meet the requirement that the pipeline be operated "to
or for the public for hire." 2 2 With a proposed new pipeline, it is unclear how a permit applicant can meet the Court's requirement other
than by showing contracts in place for future deliveries of product
through the as-yet unbuilt pipeline. Apparently, statements that the
pipeline will be made available to third parties when constructed and
after a tariff has been filed and accepted are insufficient, as a matter
of law, to show that the proposed pipeline is for a public use.
The Court also intruded itself into the legislative process by
presuming that the Legislature would not have intended to create a
system that could be "gamed" by pipeline permit applicants seeking
common carrier status merely by the checking of the appropriate box
and the filing of the letter, committing the pipeline to be subject to the
common carrier statutory and regulatory requirements.2 3 This appears to be a polar opposite view of how the Railroad Commission is
supposed to do its job when it comes to hydraulic fracturing regulation. In Coastal Oil, one of the rationales for not finding that a crossboundary frac job constituted a common law trespass claim was that
the Commission was the proper body to deal with that issue because it
had been delegated authority by the Legislature over oil and gas pro19. Id.

20. Id. at *6 (emphasizing that there is no adjudication by the Commission of the
public use issue in these common carrier application cases because the Commission is
really running a registration procedure whereby it accepts without question whatever
comes in the door and issues its common carrier designation in a pro forma or ministerial manner).
21. Id. (noting that the public use determination would require the court to ignore
the separate corporate status of a parent corporation and its subsidiary).
22. Id. at *5 (interpreting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011)).
23. Id.
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duction activities. 24 Even though the Commission had not adopted
any rules or regulations relating to hydraulic fracing, the Court in
Coastal Oil deferred to their delegated powers to regulate. Here, the
Commission adopted a form and process by which to make common
carrier determinations, a decision delegated to it by the Legislature.
Nonetheless, the Court in this case finds that it is ultimately the role of
the court to determine whether or not a prospective common carrier
pipeline is really a common carrier pipeline deserving of the legislative delegation of the power of eminent domain.
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas
Citizens for a Safe Future
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future
also involved the issue of the proper role for the court in reviewing an
agency interpretation of its statutory enabling act.2 5 Pioneer Exploration filed a permit application with the Railroad Commission in order
to convert an existing production well into an injection well.2 6 Two
hearings were conducted on the matter because there was opposition
to the issuance of the permit.2 7 The Railroad Commission was given
authority to issue injection well permits related to the disposal of oil
and gas wastes.28 The statute sets out the following four findings that
must be made before a permit may be issued: (1) that the use or installation of the injection well is in the public interest; (2) that the use or
installation of the injection well will not endanger or injure any oil,
gas, or other mineral formation; (3) that, with proper safeguards, both
ground and surface fresh water can be adequately protected from pollution; and (4) that the applicant has made a satisfactory showing of
financial responsibility if required by section 27.073 of this code.29
The parties contesting the permit claimed at the hearing that the
Railroad Commission ignored evidence relating to traffic safety matters that would follow from the permitting of the well.3 0 Pioneer did
not rebut the traffic safety evidence, and the hearing examiner did not
directly address that issue, confining his public interest determination
to matters relating to encouraging oil and gas production and preventB.

24. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14-15 (Tex.
2008) ("[T]he Railroad Commission is vested with the power and charged with the
duty of regulating the production of oil and gas for the prevention of waste as well as
for the protection of correlative rights. The Commission's role should not be supplanted by the law of trespass.").
25. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336
S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011), rev'g, 254 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007).
26. Id. at 622.
27. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 254 S.W.3d at 495-96 (indicating that the second hearing was precipitated by a mistaken identification of nearby wells, as shown on Pioneer's plat).
28. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.031 (West 2008), 27.051 (West Supp. 2011).
29. Id. § 27.051(b).
30. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 622.
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ing waste."' The Commission affirmed the decision of the examiner to
issue the permit.
The only issue before the Texas Supreme Court was the court of
appeals' conclusion that the decision needed to be remanded to the
Commission in order to broaden the Commission's restricted interpretation of the statutory use of the term "public interest" to define one
of its mandatory findings.3 2
The parties disagreed on the nature of the issue that the Court had
to decide. The Commission believed the issue was a simple one of
giving substantial deference to its interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that the principal issue was
whether the term "public interest" as used in the statute could encompass matters outside the field of oil and gas production." The Texas
Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that the principal issue
involved a matter of statutory construction and the degree to which
the reviewing court is to give deference to the agency interpretation.
The normal scope of judicial review of a Commission adjudicatory
order is under the substantial evidence test. 34 The substantial evidence standard, however, relates to the nexus between the evidence
presented at the hearing and the agency's ultimate determination. It
is not the appropriate standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation, which are pure questions of law.35
Unlike the Chevron deference test at the federal level, Texas courts
have described the deference due agency interpretations of statutes in
varying terms that are not always consistent. For example, the Texas
Supreme Court has said that an agency's interpretations of its enabling statute are entitled to "serious consideration" so long as the interpretation is reasonable and not in conflict with the statute's
language.3 6 But there are occasional Texas Supreme Court decisions
that appear to give less deference" and others that only give deference if some predicate finding is made, such as if the statutory language is ambiguous."
The Texas Supreme Court chose not to adopt the formal Chevron
two-part deference test, which requires the reviewing court to first de31. Id.

32. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 254 S.W.3d at 497-98 (holding that the plaintiffs
were given a full and fair opportunity to be heard at the two hearings so that there

was no procedural due process violation).
33. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 623.
34. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a) (West 2011); see also KRAMER & MARsupra note 12, §§ 25.05-.06 (reviewing the general application of the substantial
evidence standard to state conservation agency decisions in depth).
35. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 624.
TIN,

36. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631-32 (Tex. 2008); accord
Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Admaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2007).
37. See e.g., Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 2006); TXU
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 51 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
38. See Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944).
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termine whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," and if Congress has not, or it has spoken ambiguously,
the court does not impose its own construction but must defer to any
reasonable interpretation proffered by the agency.3 9 Chevron deference applies to a formal agency construction of a statute such as that
which follows from a formal adjudication or a formal rulemaking proceeding. Likewise, the Court chose not to adopt the federal Skidmore
deference test, which is less deferential and applies to informal interpretations of statutes by agencies.4 0
While rejecting a formal adoption of the Chevron and Skidmore
tests, the Court said that its approach, which it defined as the "serious
consideration" approach, was similar in application to Chevron and
Skidmore.4 1 The "serious consideration" approach only applies when:
(1) there are formal opinions adopted after formal proceedings; (2)
the statutory language is ambiguous, and (3) the agency's construction
is reasonable.42 Since the agency's interpretation was part of a formal
adjudicatory order, the "serious consideration" standard of review
was applicable.
Notwithstanding its pronouncement of giving deference to the
Commission's interpretation, the Court embarked on an extensive review of the relevant statutory sections, legislative history, and a comparison of the grant of powers to the Railroad Commission over
injection wells for oil and gas wastes to an analogous, but not identical, grant of powers to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") over injection wells for hazardous wastes. 4 3 Thus, what
should have been reasonably simple questions of whether the grant of
authority to the Railroad Commission was unambiguous when interpreting the term "public interest" and if not, whether the Commission's limiting interpretation was reasonable, mutated into a de novo
review of the interpretational issue. The Texas Supreme Court's review of the "statutory framework" seems to be unnecessary under either Chevron deference or "serious consideration" deference. The
Court had no trouble finding that the Commission's interpretation is
reasonable given the much more specific instructions given TCEQ in
its injection well permit review process than was given the Commission in its injection well permit review process." While conceding
39. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
40. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
41. RR. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 625 (relying solely on cases applying "serious consideration" deference).
42. Id. (citing Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 2006)).
The court really adds a fourth consideration, namely that the agency's opinion cannot
change the plain language of the statute, which gives a reviewing court considerably
more leeway in deciding whether to give deference to the agency interpretation.
43. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 626-27.

44. Id. at 628.
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that the plaintiffs' interpretation was reasonable, in a battle between
reasonable interpretations, the Commission's interpretation will prevail. Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that determinations of the "public interest" are outside the technical expertise of the
Railroad Commission, which is one reason courts do not give deference to agency decisions.4 5 There is some tension between the holding in this case and Berkley v. Railroad Commission of Texas.4 6 In
Berkley, the court did note that public safety concerns were an appropriate consideration in making a public interest determination. The
Texas Supreme Court distinguishes Berkley on the grounds that traffic
safety was not necessarily involved in that case and that the Commission apparently followed its longstanding practice of only looking at
oil- and gas-related matters in reaching its public interest conclusion.
The Court's analysis of Berkley is unpersuasive. It appears to suggest
that public safety concerns, even if they are not oil- and gas-related,
should be considered in any type of public interest rationale. It would
have been better for the Court to merely state that to the extent Berkley would require the Commission to consider non-oil- and gas-related
matters in its public interest finding, that point would be overruled.
There appears to be a reasonably sharp contrast in approaches
taken to statutory interpretation issues between Texas Citizens and
Denbury Green. A possible way to distinguish the two opinions is to
say that Denbury Green involved not statutory or regulatory interpretation issues, but constitutional interpretation issues. But if that was
the case, the Court should have invalidated the statutory grant of eminent domain powers to private common carriers without sufficient
safeguards to comply with the constitutional requirement that such
grants must contain a requirement that the state agency make a specific finding that the individual permit applicant complies with the
public use requirement. Texas Citizens announced a deferential approach to interpretational issues consistent with the federal "soft
glance" approach in Chevron and Skidmore but then went ahead and
engaged in a "hard look" approach to the agency interpretation. The
area of the appropriate scope of judicial review of agency actions is
one rife with conflicting signals and standards.4 7 The Texas Supreme
Court should be applauded for trying to "set the record straight" and
get all courts applying the same standard. Unfortunately the Court's
sub silentio "hard look" scope of judicial review in Texas Citizens and
its very "hard look" scope of judicial review in Denbury Green suggest
that future courts will have a difficult time articulating and applying a

45. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 12, §§ 24.05, 24.06 (discussing how courts
limit the deference they give to agency decisions).
46. Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009,
no pet.).
47. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 12, §§ 24.05, 24.06.
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uniform scope of judicial review for agencies that are interpreting and
applying statutory mandates.
C. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C.

In FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C.,
the Court was faced with resolving the sometimes inconsistent relationship between common law causes of action and Railroad Commission orders.4 8 This question was addressed in Railroad Commission v.
Manziel, which involved an adjacent owner asserting that a Commission order allowing a Rule 37 exception well to be converted into an
injection well for the purpose of engaging in a secondary recovery operation. 4 9 In dissolving the trial court's injunction against the Commission order approving the secondary recovery project and the
injection permit, the Court said:
The orthodox rules and principles applied by the courts as regards
surface invasions of land may not be appropriately applied to subsurface invasions as arise out of the secondary recovery of natural
resources ....

We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent waste, protect correlative rights, or in the exercise of other
powers within its jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes secondary
recovery projects, a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary recovery forces move across lease lines, and the operations
are not subject to an injunction on that basis. The technical rules of
trespass have no place in the consideration of the validity of the
orders of the Commission.o
Since Manziel involved a challenge to the Commission order and
thus did not directly involve a common law trespass action, the impact
of Commission orders on common law causes of action was somewhat
unclear. In Coastal Oil, the Court relied in part on Manziel but never
directly resolved the issue of how Commission orders impact common
law causes of action since, in that case, the challenged hydraulic fracturing operations were not approved by the Commission. It is this
issue that the Texas Supreme Court resolves in FPL Farming.
In 1996, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
("TNRCC") issued two permits to EPS that authorized the permit
holder to inject commercial non-hazardous waste into a specific formation." FPL owned both the surface and the subsurface estate on
an adjacent tract, and received notice of the permit because EPS's
application showed that the injected water would likely migrate into
48. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. (FPL Farming III), 54 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 1744, 2011 WL 3796612 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
49. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
50. Id. at 568-69.

51. See FPL Farming III, 2011 WL 3796612, at *1. The TNRCC was replaced by
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality in 2004. Id. at *7 n.2.
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withdrew its hearing request. In 1999, EPS sought to amend one of
its permits to increase the allowed injection rate, and once again FPL
requested a contested case hearing. 54 The administrative law judge
recommended that the permit be granted. That recommendation was
followed by TCEQ. FPL then appealed the permit amendment decision, and the court of appeals concluded that the permit was appropriately issued but eschewed making any findings as to whether FPL had
any existing rights in the subsurface estate that would be damaged by
EPS's injection." In dicta, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that
"should the waste plume migrate to the subsurface of FPL Farming's
property and cause harm, FPL Farming may seek damages from
EPS."5 6 Three years later, FPL filed this action seeking damages and/
or injunctive relief based on various common law theories including
trespass, negligence, and unjust enrichment.
The jury found that there was no trespass, and after the trial court
dismissed its motion for a new trial, FPL appealed. The court of appeals, focusing on language in Manziel and Coastal Oil that seemingly
insulates permit applicants from liability for trespass, affirmed the
trial court's take-nothing judgment." The opinion quoted from
Coastal Oil's analysis of Manziel, which stated that Manziel "'relied
heavily on the fact that the [Railroad] Commission had approved the
operation.'""' As noted earlier, Coastal Oil is a common law trespass
and breach of implied covenant case without the added complexity of
fitting those claims into a direct appeal of a Railroad Commission order. The Manziel decision alternates between being a simple case of
judicial review of a Commission order with the more complex issue of
what impact that order may have on private, common law rights.59
52. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. (FPL Farming 11), 305
S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009), rev'd, FPL Farming III, 54 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 1744, 2011 WL 3796612 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
53. FPL Farming II, 305 S.W.3d at 741 (noting that EPS paid $185,000 to FPL).
54. Id.

55. Id. at 741-42. The earlier Court of Appeal decision was not officially published. See FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Comm'n (FPL FarmingI), No. 0302-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 6, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
56. FPL FarmingIII, 2011 WL 3796612, at *3 (quoting FPL Farming1, 2003 WL

247183, at *5).
57. FPL Farming II, 305 S.W.3d at 742-44.
58. Id. at 744 (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d
1, 12 (Tex. 2008)).
59. See generally KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 12, chs. 21-22 (pointing out that
the Manziel decision ignores the longstanding principle that oil and gas conservation
agencies are agencies of limited power which normally do not include the power to
resolve common law disputes between parties); see also SWEPI, L.P. v. Camden Res.,
Inc., 139 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet denied); In re SWEPI, L.P.,
103 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); KRAMER & MARTIN, supra
note 12, § 24.02.
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CoastalOil complicates the matter by extensively relying on the Commission's expertise and power to prevent waste, conserve natural resources, and protect correlative rights to justify its finding that the rule
of capture precludes a finding of common law trespass in the crossboundary hydraulic fracturing scenario. 6 0 Relying on the dicta of
Manziel that one cannot have a cross-boundary subsurface trespass
that is authorized by the state conservation agency that takes into consideration the public and private interests involved, the court of appeals concluded: "that under the common law, when a state agency
has authorized deep subsurface injections, no trespass occurs when
fluids that were injected at deep levels are then alleged to have mi1
grated at those levels into the deep subsurface of nearby tracts." 6
This case was attractive to the Texas Supreme Court not only because it raised significant jurisprudential and practical issues, but also
because another Texas court of appeals had reached the opposite result.62 The Court's resolution of the conflict between the two courts
of appeal was rather straightforward:
As a general rule, a permit granted by an agency does not act to
immunize the permit holder from civil tort liability from private
parties for actions arising out of the use of the permit. This is because a permit is a "negative pronouncement" that "grants no affirmative rights to the permittee. "63
The Court reached the common sense conclusion that the TCEQ,
or any other administrative agency, does not have the delegated authority to resolve common law claims unless the Legislature provides
for statutory remedies that are exclusive.' The relevant provisions of
the Water Code delegating to the TCEQ the power to issue permits
for the underground injection of everything but oil field wastes do not
contain language showing a legislative intent to preempt or co-opt
60. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 14-15. The Coastal Oil case is discussed in greater
depth at Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface Trespass After Coastalv. Garza, 60 INsT. ON
OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 11-1 (2009); Bruce M. Kramer, Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust: Some New Paradigmsfor the Rule of Captureand Implied Covenant Jurisprudence, E. MIN. L. FOUND. 329 (2009).
61. FPL Farming II, 305 S.W.3d at 744-45.

62. See Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2009, no pet.) This case, like Manziel, was a direct appeal of a Commission order and
not a common law action between two private parties. See KRAMER & MARTIN,
supra note 12, § 22.05 (discussing Berkley and the Court of Appeals decision in FPL
Farming II).

63. FPL FarmingIII, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1744, 1747, 2011 WL 3796612, at *3 (Tex.
Aug. 26, 2011) (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 170 S.W.2d 189, 191
(Tex. 1943)).
64. See id. at *3-4 (relying on Magnolia Petroleum to support the conclusion that
while private law issues may be considered by the Railroad Commission, such as
when issuing a permit to drill, that permit cannot resolve any common law trespass or
ownership claims brought by another private party relating to the lands covered by
the permit to drill).
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civil actions. 5 In fact, a TCEQ regulation specifically provides: "The
issuance of a permit does not authorize any injury to persons or property or an invasion of other property rights, or any infringement of
state or local law or regulations." 6 6 The Court's holding is consistent
with the policy that state agencies do not have the power to adjudicate
private claims. Where the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning loses
some of its traction is in its attempt to resolve the inconsistencies between Manziel, Coastal Oil, and FPL Farming.

The appellate court's reading of Manziel is certainly justified from
the language used even though that language should have been
treated as dicta since the Manziel result depended on the legality of
the order and not the common law trespass issue. The Texas Supreme
Court focused on the language in Manziel that said that the impact of
the Railroad Commission order on the trespass claim was not being
decided.67 Thus, Manziel could be treated as having no impact on the
issue before the Court in FPL Farming.
The Court has greater difficulty in dealing with Coastal Oil. While
Coastal Oil was a common law trespass action and thus was similar to
FPL Farming,the Court noted that both "the rule of capture and administrative deference to agency interpretations" were important
building blocks in finding that no trespass occurred when there was a
cross-boundary migration of injected frac fluids. 8 Since FPL Farming
did not involve oil and gas operations, a reading of the Court's language might suggest that governmentally-permitted injections that
cross property lines in the non-oil and gas scenario are subject to common law trespass liability, while governmentally-permitted injections
that cross property lines in the oil and gas scenario are not subject to
such liability because of the importance of the industry as reflected in
both statutory and judicial policy pronouncements.6 9 It is certainly
true, as the Court stated, that adjacent owners can protect themselves
against neighboring fracing operations through a number of different
strategies, but the owner in Manziel did not have those same options.
In the end the Court concluded:
Manziel and Garza did not decide the issues in this case, and because of the oil and gas interests at issue in Manziel and Garza,

65. See id. at *4-5.
66. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.122(c) (2011).
67. FPL Farming III, 2011 WL 3796612, at *6.

68. Id. at *6. The quoted language makes more sense if "administrative" is replaced by "judicial" because giving "administrative deference" to an agency's interpretation makes little sense. The court does not deal with CoastalOil's language that
technical issues should be best left to administrative agencies and language that courts
are ill-equipped to handle such technical issues. One could make the same arguments
in FPL FarmingIII.
69. See id. at *6.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 18 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 21

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

640

[Vol. 18

their reasoning does not dictate our analysis in this wastewater injection trespass case.70
Because the court of appeals did not deal with the common law
claims and affirmative defenses as decided by the trial court, the Texas
Supreme Court opted to remand the case to the court of appeals to
resolve those issues which were now to be determinative since the
TCEQ permit would no longer preclude those common law claims.
III.
A.

TAXATION

TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs

In TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, a case decided after
Texas Citizens but before Denbury Green, the Texas Supreme Court
again dealt with the issue of the proper level of deference afforded to
an administrative agency in interpreting either its statutory enabling
act or its own regulations." Unfortunately for Texas administrative
law practitioners, this opinion followed neither case and applied a
"hard look" to an agency's interpretation of the relevant statute and
regulations utilizing some traditional administrative law principles.
TGS was in the business of gathering and marketing seismic data in
Texas and throughout the nation. It typically required potential customers to sign a master license agreement, followed by a specific license agreement relating to a particular data set.7 2 The specific
license agreement gave the licensee access to the data for its use subject to restrictions on the licensee's ability to allow third parties to
access the data. The data was delivered through some type of tangible
media such as magnetic tapes, printed materials, or film. 7 3 For many
years, the Texas Comptroller's Office treated TGS's licensing process
as the sale of an intangible, which meant that, for franchise tax purposes, the revenue was allocated to the customer's legal domicile.74 In
2004, as part of its audit, the Comptroller characterized this licensing
revenue as constituting receipts from the use of a license that resulted
in the revenue being allocated to Texas if the license was used in
Texas.75 The audit showed a substantial deficiency in the amount of
franchise tax owed because many of the licenses were being used in
Texas. TGS then paid the additional taxes, penalties, and interest
under protest in order to challenge the validity of the Comptroller's
70. Id. at *6.
71. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. 2011).
72. Id. at 435.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 436 (referencing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(a)(6) (West 2008)
(providing that the gross receipts of taxable entities are the sum of its receipts from
other business done in the state).
75. Id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(a)(4); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
§ 3.549(e)(30)(A)(iii) (2011)).
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decision.7 6 Both the trial court and the court of appeals upheld the
Comptroller's decision.7 7 The court of appeals did not expressly deal
with the deference issue; instead it applied various statutory canons of
construction, including the plain meaning canon, and found that the
relevant statutory provisions supported the Comptroller." The case
also involved the Comptroller's interpretation of its own regulations
designed to deal with the issue raised by the taxpayer.
The franchise tax is a tax imposed on the privilege of doing business
in Texas. 79 Over its long history, it has been changed by the Legislature both as to its overall purpose and how it functions. The basis for
determining the amount of franchise tax owed is the concept of an
entity's "taxable margin,"s 0 which requires the multiplication of an entity's capital by a fraction, "the numerator of which consists of receipts
from business done in Texas (Texas-sourced receipts), and the denominator of which consists of all receipts from business anywhere, including Texas."" In sourcing receipts in Texas, the statute sets forth six
categories, of which two are critical to TGS's tax liability. One source
of receipts is "the use of a patent, copyright, trademark, franchise, or
license in this state," while the other is "other business done in this
state."" If TGS's income from the licensing of its seismic data is classified under the former category, the Comptroller's decision is correct,
but if it is categorized under the latter, the taxpayer wins.
The Court applied the "serious consideration" deference model
with the two recognized exceptions that the agency's interpretation
cannot be "plainly erroneous" or "inconsistent with the language of
the statute, regulation, or rule."" But the Court added: "Deference
to the agency's interpretation, however, is not conclusive or unlimited."84 This opened the door for the Court to get a very "hard look"
76. Id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.052(a) (West Supp. 2011) (requiring
taxpayers to make such payments as a condition precedent to filing suit challenging
the alleged deficiency)).
77. Id. at 436-37.
78. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 268 S.W.3d 637, 645-46 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2008), rev'd, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011). Statutory canons of construction, like deed or contract canons of construction, reflect a veritable rainbow of
truisms and assumptions that may or may not assist the decision-maker in divining the
intent of the legislature or the grantor. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of
InterpretingMineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction,
24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1993).
79. TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Bullock v. Nat'l Bancshares Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1979)).
80. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (West Supp. 2011), TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.101 (West 2008).
81. TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 437 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.006
(West Supp. 2011)).
82. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(a)(4), (6) (West 2008).
83. TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 438 (relying on Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore,

845 S.W.2d 802, 823 (Tex. 1993); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 809
S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1991); Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944)).
84. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. 1999)).
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at the statutory and regulatory language while professing to apply a
deferential standard. As with canons of construction, one can normally find canons that oppose each other. That type of judicial decision-making leads to substantial uncertainty since the courts can
choose among competing canons, or in this case, choose to ignore the
deferential or "soft glance" view of judicial review and apply a nondeferential "hard look," in essence making the review de novo. This
de novo approach was clearly reflected by the Court's listing of the
standard canons of statutory construction as guidance for its "hard
look" approach." The Court then embarked on its "hard look" analyzing the history of how the Comptroller and the Legislature have
dealt with the issue of sourcing receipts from intangible assets. The
Court rejected the Comptroller's interpretation of the statute and the
Comptroller's regulations and instead found inconsistencies between
the interpretation and the language of the regulations. There was no
indication that the Comptroller's interpretation was given "serious
consideration" as the Court said is required under a deferential approach. The Court's "hard look" was reflected in its comparison of
how other states' statutes deal with the issue in a manner more explicit than Texas.86 Under a deference model, the issue should not be
whether other states have more clear statutes but whether or not the
interpretation proffered by the Comptroller is reasonable. Instead,
the court embarks on a de novo "hard look" as if no agency interpretation was involved.
IV.

JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS

A. Tawes v. Barnes
In Tawes v. Barnes," the Texas Supreme Court responded to certified questions submitted by the Fifth Circuit in a bankruptcy case.
85. TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 439. Here is a paraphrased listing of the canons
cited by the court: (1) primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to Legislature's
intent; (2) intent is discerned from the words used; (3) terms with a particular meaning or terms assigned a particular meaning are given the particular meaning; (4) undefined terms are given their "ordinary meaning;" (5) undefined terms are not given
their "ordinary meaning" if a different or more precise definition is apparent from the
term's use in the context of the statute; (6) if the statutory language is unambiguous,
the language is given its plain meaning unless it would lead to an absurd result; (7)
four corners canon; and (8) presumption that the Legislature chose its language with
care. Id. The Author always questions the use of canons of construction when they
are listed seriatim in the opinion as opposed to being used to support individual interpretational results as announced by the court. This is a prime example of where canons replace "rational decision-making" and the notion of deference to an
administrative interpretation of a statute or its own rule.
86. Id. at 442 n.11.
87. Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2011).
88. In re Moose Oil & Gas Co., 613 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
The Bankruptcy Court decision is Barnes v. Dominion Okla. Tex. Exploration &
Prod., Inc. (In re Moose Oil & Gas Co.), 347 B.R. 868 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006), affd in
part, rev'd in part, Tawes v. Barnes, 2008 WL 905209 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008).
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Moose Oil & Gas purchased several oil and gas leases. One of these
leases, denoted as the Baker Lease, was assigned to a group of investors, one of whom was Tawes. The Barnes' leased their minerals in a
tract adjacent to the Baker Lease to a third party. In order to jointly
develop the Baker and Barnes leases, the owners who were assigned
the Barnes lease, which included Moose, Tawes, and Dominion entered into a working interest unit agreement ("WIUA") and a joint
operating agreement ("JOA"). The two agreements provided for the
initial drilling of a test well. The JOA also gave the working interest
parties the option to consent or go non-consent as to future well drilling operations.8 9 As is typically included in the non-consent election,
there was a contractual risk penalty provided for that would be recovered out of the non-consenting working interest owner's share of production. During the period of time prior to payout of the nonconsenting owner's share of expenses plus risk penalty, the non-consenting owner is deemed to have relinquished its working interest
share to the consenting parties. 0 The WIUA further provided that
each party is responsible for their own lease burdens, including any
royalties or overriding royalties.9 1
After the drilling of the initial well, Moose Oil proposed two additional wells. Dominion, which was the operator, chose to go non-consent and thus ceded its operator status to Moose Oil. Tawes elected to
participate in the two proposed wells. It is undisputed that Barnes
owns a 9.675% royalty in each of the wells drilled on the pooled unit.
In 2000, Barnes filed suit in state court against Moose Oil and Dominion seeking an additional 8.241% royalty on the two wells where Dominion went non-consent. In 2002, at Dominion's request, the matter
was removed to the Bankruptcy Court since Moose Oil filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.9 2 At the foreclosure sale, Tawes
purchased Moose Oil's interests in the three wells in the pooled unit.
The bankruptcy court found that Dominion was liable to Barnes for
Barnes's undisputed 9.675% royalty interest. Barnes continued litigating her claim for the additional royalty amounts that led to a settlement with Dominion. Tawes, however, refused to participate in the
settlement agreement and Barnes continued her claim for unpaid royalties.93 The bankruptcy court determined that as a signatory party to
the JOA, Tawes became obligated to pay Barnes her royalty interest
89. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 421; see also

KRAMER & MARTIN,

supra note 12,

§ 17.02112] (discussing some of the issues involved in the consent/non-consent election for JOA's). The typical unit operating agreement does not provide for the consent/non-consent election procedure while the typical joint operating agreement does
so provide. Id.
90. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 422-23.
91. Id. at 422 (holding that each working interest owner was also obligated to
make all payments necessary to keep their leases alive).
92. Id. at 423-24.
93. Id. at 424.
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pursuant to the Barnes/Dominion lease.9 4 Upon appeal, the Fifth Cir95
cuit certified three questions to the Texas Supreme Court. The
Texas Supreme Court only answered the first of the three questions
since their answer co-opts the need to answer the second and third
questions. The first question was:
Does Barnes have any right [to] enforce the [Dominion-Moose
Agreements]-the WIUA and the JOA-between Dominion,
Moose . . . and the Moose Assignees, including Tawes, to recover

unpaid royalties, between the date of first production and February
2002, of Baker-Barnes Nos. 1 & 2 wells under what we have called
the "Royalty Provision" of the JOA, either as a third-party beneficiary of the WIUA and JOA or by virtue of having privity of estate
with Tawes?9 6
The Texas Supreme Court answered no to this question holding that
Barnes was neither a third-party beneficiary to the JOA or WIUA, or
in privity of estate with Tawes. 97
A third party may only enforce a contract it did not sign when the
"parties to the contract entered the agreement with the clear and express intention of directly benefiting the third party."9 8 In addition to
this difficult standard, Texas courts presume that parties contract
solely for themselves and not for the benefit of third parties. Barnes's
principal claim was that the JOA directed Tawes, who consented to
participate in the two wells, to pay all royalties, including the Barnes'
royalty. Tawes asserted that the principal purpose of a JOA is to govern the relationship between the operators and non-operators and
only indirectly deal with royalty interest owners. The bulk of any
JOA discusses how the working interest owners are to allocate the
various operational costs that are to be incurred by the operator in
conducting the joint operations. Given that primary purpose, the
Court found that neither Dominion, Moose Oil, nor Tawes intended
to confer a direct benefit on any of its royalty owners who are not
parties to the JOA. Construing the JOA and WIUA in pari materia,
the Court also noted that the WIUA imposed upon each individual
working interest owner the duty to make all payments to its lessors in
order to maintain the lease. Given Texas jurisprudence on the third94. Id.
95. Id. at 424-25.
96. Id. (quoting In re Moose Oil & Gas Co., 613 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam)).
97. Id. at 428-30. The court does not answer the more challenging question as to
the status of a non-consenting working interest owner during the pre-payout period.
In Boldrick v. BTA Oil Producers,222 S.W.3d 672, 675, 677 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2007, no pet.), the court concluded that an overriding royalty interest carved out of a
working interest prior to a non-consent election is not entitled to recover any royalty
until its working interest owner begins to receive production proceeds after payout of
the expenses plus risk penalty.
98. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Electric

Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999)).
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party beneficiary doctrine that makes it difficult to achieve that status,
the Texas Supreme Court believed that the language of the JOA regarding individual working owner responsibility to pay royalty interest
owners was insufficient to overcome the presumption of no direct
benefits to non-signatory parties.
The privity of estate claim made by Barnes was based on the notion
that when Tawes consented to the two new wells and Dominion went
non-consent, Barnes stepped into the shoes of Dominion and thus established privity of estate between Barnes and Tawes, just as there
was between Barnes and Dominion. It is clear that where an assignee
succeeds to the entire leasehold interest of the original lessee, privity
of estate exists between the original lessor and the assignee. 99 Barnes
argued that the leasehold covenant to pay royalty, which normally is a
covenant that runs with the land, burdens Tawes as the assignee of the
Dominion working interest during the period after non-consent and
prior to payout. The Court found language in the JOA denying that
the JOA involved an assignment or cross-assignment of interests along
with the reversionary interest held by Dominion once payout plus risk
penalty is achieved to deny that Barnes and Tawes are in privity of
estate. 100 The Court further found that Tawes' election to participate
and pick up Dominion's share of the working interest was not an express assumption of the Dominion/Barnes lease and royalty covenants. Before a party will be deemed to have assumed the burden of
covenants, which would otherwise not be binding on it, specific language must be found in the agreement; the JOA did not contain such
specific language.
V.
A.

OIL AND GAS LEASES

BP America Production Co. v. Marshall

In BP America Production Co. v. Marshall, the Court was faced

with numerous problems arising from the alleged termination of a
lease for failing to comply with the terms of various savings clauses
contained therein. 0 ' This case involved the 17,712-acre Slator Ranch
whose mineral estate was divided between Tenneco Oil, which owned
50%, and several other individuals and entities including the Vaquillas
Ranch entities and the Marshalls. BP's predecessors in interest negotiated oil and gas leases with Tenneco, the Vaquillas Ranch entities,
99. See generally Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.
1982); Davis v. Vidal, 151 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1912).
100. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 429-30. The non-consenting working interest owner's
reversionary interest upon payout is similar to a lessee/assignor's retention of a one
day reversion which would make the transfer a sub-lease and not an assignment. See,
e.g., Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor, 317 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. 1958).
101. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall (Marshall II), 342 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2011).
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and the Marshalls.10 2 The leases contained various savings provisions
including one that provided that the lease would not terminate at the
end of the primary term in the absence of production in paying quantities if BP was engaged in good faith drilling or reworking operations.os The primary terms of the Vaquillas and Marshall lease were
set to expire on July 11, 1980. Two weeks prior to that date, BP drilled
a well that was eventually deemed to be non-productive. 10 Noting
that there had been no production by July 11th, a member of the Marshall family inquired of BP as to why the lease had not terminated.
He was informed by letter that BP was engaging in a series of actions
designed to comply with the continuous operations clause of the
lease. 105 In March 1981, BP contacted Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas
Corp. for the purpose of giving it a farmout on a portion of the Slator
Ranch. On the same day that Sanchez-O'Brien and BP entered into a
series of agreements designed to transfer the leasehold development
rights to Sanchez-O'Brien, BP permanently plugged and abandoned
the only well it drilled on the premises.1 0 6 The farmout well, which
was drilled within a month of the plugging and abandonment of the
BP-drilled well, was a success and production in paying quantities has
continued from 1981 to the present time. Through a series of assignments from Sanchez-O'Brien, Wagner Oil became an owner of a portion of the Marshall and Vaquillas leases.zov
In 1997, Vaquillas sued Wagner for breaches of several of the implied covenants. During discovery it was given information suggesting
that BP had not complied with the requirements of the leasehold savings provision, which, according to Vaquillas, would have terminated
its lease in 1981.108 In 2001, the Marshalls intervened in this action
similarly alleging that their lease automatically terminated in 1981.
They added a fraud claim and asserted that the statute of limitations
was tolled due to fraudulent concealment by BP.1 09
102. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall (Marshall1), 288 S.W.3d 430, 438 (Tex. App.San Antonio 2008), rev'd, Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2011).
103. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 63.
104. Id. See also Marshall1, 288 S.W.3d at 438-39 (explaining in detail the various
operations and activities relating to this particular well).
105. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 63.
106. Id. at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id. The theory was that BP had not complied with the requirement that its
drilling and/or reworking operations on the now plugged and abandoned well be conducted in good faith with the objective of achieving production in paying quantities.
Id. Because more than sixty days would have elapsed between the "fraudulent" BP
operations and Sanchez-O'Brien's spudding of its well, the lease would have terminated automatically. Id.
109. Id. Whether the "fraud" claim made by the Marshalls was nothing more than
a part of its fraudulent concealment assertion designed to toll the running of the statute of limitations is not clear. A fraud claim would require the party asserting it to
show detrimental reliance while a fraudulent concealment claim does not have such a
requirement.
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The jury found in favor of the Marshalls in their action against BP
but dismissed all of the claims against Wagner on the basis that Wagner's continued production from the leasehold premises constituted
adverse possession of the mineral estate.110 The court of appeals upheld the jury verdict against BP on both the fraud claim and the fraudulent concealment claim relating to the statute of limitations."' The
court of appeals reversed the findings in favor of Wagner Oil relating
to its affirmative defense of adverse possession.112
Whether or not a statute of limitations will be tolled or not begin to
run under the separate doctrines of the discovery rule and fraudulent
concealment has been the subject of much litigation both within and
outside the oil and gas patch." 3 The discovery rule delays the date
when the cause of action first accrues until such time as the injury
could have been reasonably discovered.1 14 A party must meet two
requirements to have the discovery rule applied "categorically": (1)
the nature of the injury must be inherently undiscoverable; and (2) the
evidence of injury must be objectively verifiable."1 ' Because the discovery rule is to be narrowly or strictly applied as an exception to the
policies underlying the statute of limitations, the party asserting it
must show that the type of injury alleged could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.' 16 Where the information is available to the public, such as through the records of the
Railroad Commission, the discovery rule is not applicable. In this
case, Marshall's own expert said that he discovered BP's alleged failure to comply with the good faith continuous operations clause by
examining BP's filings with the Commission. The gravamen of their
claim, namely that BP's operations were not conducted in a good-faith
attempt to secure production in paying quantities, was readily discoverable by a search of BP's well logs and plugging report."'
Unlike the discovery rule, which is categorically applied, the fraudulent concealment doctrine is fact-specific based on actions or inactions
taken by a party after the cause of action has accrued.118 In order to
110. Id. at 64-65.
111. Marshall I, 288 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008), rev'd, 342
S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2011).
112. Id. at 462.
113. For oil and gas-related cases dealing with one or both of these doctrines see
Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008); Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58
S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2001); HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998);
Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. Hunt, 808 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
denied).
114. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996).
115. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 65-66.
116. Id. at 66 (citing Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734-35).
117. Id. at 66-67.
118. For a particularly harsh denial of a fraudulent concealment case, see Kerlin v.
Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008) (involving an attorney and his clients in a matter
dealing with an oil and gas conveyance).
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prove fraudulent concealment, a party must show that "the defendant
actually knew that the plaintiff was in fact wronged and concealed that
fact to deceive the plaintiff."' 19 Further, the party asserting the doctrine must show that it was reasonably diligent in protecting its interests. Even though BP sent a letter to the Marshalls that contained
allegedly fraudulent statements designed to deceive them about the
nature of the operations on the lease, the Marshalls were obligated to
perform "additional investigation," such as checking the Railroad
Commission records.12 0 Furthermore, the Marshalls needed to have
shown that they reasonably relied to their detriment on the fraudulent
statements. Again, since the records were available from the Railroad
Commission by October 1982, one cannot reasonably rely on the BP
letter when independent, publically available information can be obtained that would belie the fraudulent statements.
Since Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, the law of adverse possession will give limitations title to the fee simple determinable estate to
a holdover lessee who continues to produce hydrocarbons and pay
royalties after the lease has automatically terminated. 12 1 This case
adds an element that was not present in Pool where the holdover/
producing lessee was the only working interest owner on the leasehold
estate. The Pool Court found that the act of producing and paying
royalties, instead of 100% of production to the lessor who had become
the owner of the mineral estate upon the automatic termination doctrine, met the statutory requirements of being an "actual and visible
appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a
claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of
another person. "122 In this case, Vaquillas argued that because Wagner did not own 100% of the leasehold estate, they became co-tenants
of the mineral estate upon the termination of its lease.123 in cases
involving co-tenants, an additional requirement must be shown to successfully assert an adverse possession claim. That requirement is
ouster.124 The holdover lessee's continued payment of royalty is
treated as sufficient to meet the ouster requirement because the lessee
is asserting that a lessor-lessee relationship is in existence rather than
a co-tenancy relationship whereby the unleased co-tenant would be
entitled to its pro rata share of revenue less its pro rata share of ex119. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 67 (citing Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex.
1999); Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam)).
120. Id. at 67-68.
121. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).
122. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021(1) (West 2002).
123. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 69.
124. Id. at 70. See also Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Tex. 1990) (pronouncing the general rule relating to how a co-tenant may adversely possess its cotenant's interest); Rick v. Grubbs, 214 S.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Tex. 1948) (same); Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171-72 (1884) (same).
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penses.12 5 The continued payment of royalties also meets the hostility
and "notice" elements of adverse possession, along with other indicia
that the holdover lessee is continuing the lessor/lessee relationship including the execution of division orders and payment of taxes on the
lessor's royalty interest. The fact that the holdover lessee has no subjective intent to adversely possess is insufficient to defeat its claim. 126
The effect of the Court's analysis on the Marshall/BP fraud litigation is to require its dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. The
Vaquillas/Wagner trespass litigation was resolved by reinstating the
trial court's order that awarded title to the Vaquillas's leasehold estate
to Wagner based on its acquisition of limitations title.
VI. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.
In Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies,
Ltd., the Court attempted to resolve the tension between the parol
evidence rule and the surrounding circumstances doctrine. 127 Under
the parol evidence rule, testimony or extrinsic evidence attempting to
determine the intent of the parties to a written agreement is inadmissible, while under the surrounding circumstances doctrine, such testimony or extrinsic evidence is admissible to the extent that such
testimony or evidence relates to the formation of the contract. 128 in
2002, Offshore Specialty Fabricators agreed to construct an offshore
drilling platform for The Houston Exploration Co. The contract required Offshore to obtain builder's risk insurance naming Houston as
an additional insured. Offshore's Texas insurance broker used the
Lloyd's of London market for the policy. 129 Working through a
London-based broker, negotiations commenced between Offshore
and Wellington. The negotiators used a printed form policy as provided by Wellington as the basis for the final insurance contract.
There were interdelineations from the form policy before the final
contract was agreed to. The final contract was an original document
incorporating the changes made to the printed form. After the insurance contract was executed, the drilling platform became unstable requiring immediate repairs that were delayed by weather in the Gulf of
125. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 71-72. See generally Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v.
Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008) (discussing of the rights of unleased cotenants).
126. Marshall II, 342 S.W.3d at 72.
127. Hous. Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d
462 (Tex. 2011). It should be noted that contract canons of construction and propertybased canons of construction are not the same although there is some substantial
overlap between the two. For an exhaustive study of property-based canons of construction, see Kramer, supra note 78.
128. Hous. Exploration Co., 352 S.W.3d at 469.

129. Id. at 464-65 (providing a short history of the development of the Lloyd's
insurance market and how it operates).
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Mexico. Offshore submitted a claim for $3.25 million of which about
$1 million was for weather stand-by charges. Wellington refused to
pay the stand-by charges based on the fact that such charges had been
deleted from the form contract and were therefore not covered by
other provisions of the contract. 3 o The trial court refused to admit
the evidence relating to the deletion of whether stand-by problems
were a covered expense, asserting that it was parol evidence that varied the terms of the final contract.13' The court of appeals concluded
that the deletion of a specific provision that would have treated standby charges as covered claims was admissible to ascertain the intent of

the parties.132
The Court only applied one canon of construction, albeit with a
number of subparts:
A written contract must be construed to give effect to the parties'
intent expressed in the text as understood in light of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the contract's execution, subject to the
parol evidence rule.' 33
The parol evidence rule does not preclude the consideration of surrounding circumstances that "inform," rather than "vary from or contradict" the contract text.134 The Court presented no guidelines as to
what informs and what varies or contradicts, giving trial judges substantial discretion as to when to allow such type of evidence where an
unambiguous document is involved. Relying on Professor Williston's
landmark contracts treatise, the Court believed that objectively determinable factors give context to the transaction and thus allowed the
Court to ascertain the parties' intent.13 5 When parties delete specific
provisions of an insurance contract that deal with what types of claims
are covered, the Court found that to ignore such actions or treat them
as irrelevant "blinks reality." 136
130. Id. at 467.
131. Id. at 468.

132. Hous. Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d
277, 288-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008), affd, 352 S.W.3d 462 (Tex.
2011).
133. Hous. Exploration Co., 352 S.W.3d at 469 (relying on Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley,
626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981) and City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co.,
432 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1968) for its particular distillation of the primary canon of construction). Sun Oil lists several related, if not duplicative canons of construction, but
clearly does incorporate the notion that even as to an unambiguous contract, evidence
relating to the surrounding circumstances at the time of the negotiation and drafting
of the instrument is relevant and admissible. Sun Oil, 626 S.W.2d at 732. With property-based canons of construction, the courts have tended to minimize the admission
of parol evidence, including surrounding circumstances evidence, notwithstanding
language in the Restatement of Property to the contrary. See Kramer, supra note 78,
at 6-19.
134. Hous. Exploration Co., 352 S.W.3d at 469.
135. Id. (quoting 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTs

§ 32:7 (4th ed.

1999)).
136. Id. at 470.
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Not only is such evidence admissible and relevant, according to the
Court, "deletions in a printed form agreement must be considered in
construing the other provisions."137 Whether the deletions or interdelineations inexorably lead to one interpretation is not determinative as
to whether or not such evidence is admissible and relevant. In this
case, the Court took the view that the parties should not be allowed to
replace a specific covered claim that had been deleted through the
construction of other provisions of the contract that might somehow
be read to include that claim.
Justice Johnson, in a concurring opinion, also agreed that the deletion of language from a form contract in the negotiation phase is relevant but would emphasize that the final contract language does not
cover the weather stand-by claim made by the insured.13 8 Chief Justice Jefferson, speaking for Justices Willett and Lehrmann, decried the
Court's entrance into "a morass of indeterminacy" that might wreak
havoc with written contracts since parties would be encouraged to
seek the admission of extrinsic or parol evidence to not only inform
the Court as to the parties' intent but to attempt to vary or to contradict the written instrument. 139
This tension or duality is not new to contract or property-based construction issues.140 In the property-based arena, courts have generally
been less receptive to finding instruments ambiguous than they do in
the contracts-based arena. Likewise, courts applying property-based
principles are less receptive to considering surrounding circumstances
evidence in the absence of such ambiguity, than are courts in the contract-based arena. While the Restatement of Property § 242 adopted
in 1940 took the position that surrounding circumstances evidence was
relevant, such evidence has only occasionally been admitted and only
occasionally been mentioned.' 4 1 The Williston approach for contracts,
however, is much more widely accepted, and, notwithstanding the dissenting opinion's protestations to the contrary, the mention and use of
surrounding circumstances evidence in contract-based canons of construction is much more widespread.
137. Id. at 471 (relying on an oil and gas lease case, Gibson v. Turner, 294 S.W.2d
781, 785 (Tex. 1956), and a natural gas pipeline easement case, Hous. Pipe Line Co. v.
Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1964)). Gibson involved an interdelineation of the proportionate reduction clause of a form lease. While stating that an unambiguous lease
could be construed through the use of surrounding circumstances evidence, in that
case the interdelineation occurred on the final lease instrument executed by the parties. Gibson, 294 S.W.2d at 783, 785.
138. Hous. Exploration Co., 352 S.W.3d at 473-74 (Johnson, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 474-75 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
140. See Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex.
1940); Kramer, supra note 78, at 10-11 (discussing Anderson).
141. See Kramer, supra note 78, at 14; Gibson v. Turner, 294 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Tex.
1956) (specifically mentioning and accepting the admissibility of surrounding circumstances evidence in a property-based dispute).
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VII. SPLIT ESTATES-RIGHTS OF THE SEVERED MINERAL OWNER
A. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v.
National Park Service
In Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Service, the Fifth Circuit dealt with the somewhat arcane issue of interpreting a unique "Consent Statute" whereby the Texas Legislature
authorized the federal government to acquire public and private lands
that eventually became part of the Padre Island National Seashore.142
Although the case largely devolves into a matter of statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit made some statements that seemingly do some
violence to long-held oil and gas jurisprudential principles.
Congress authorized the creation of the National Seashore in 1962
with the passage of the Enabling Act. 143 The Enabling Act authorized
the National Park Service ("Service") to purchase or condemn private
property within the boundaries of the Seashore but required the Service to obtain state lands only with the state's "concurrence." 144 Texas
enacted a "Consent Statute" that allowed these condemnations but
reserved to the state the mineral estate with an express easement of
surface use in order to develop the minerals.145 The "Consent Statute" also provided that the Service's purchase of the surface estate
should "not deprive the grantor or successor in title [to the mineral
estate] the right of ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring for,
developing ... and transporting minerals from beneath said lands and
waters . ... "146

In 2001, the Service developed the Oil and Gas Management Plan
("the Plan") that divided the National Parks and National Seashores
into various areas, some of which essentially precluded surface use for
mineral extraction purposes. 147 As th
the Plan applied to Padre Island,
the Service admitted that some 7.6% of the surface estate would be
effectively closed, and some 52.7% would have substantial restrictions
imposed on the mineral owners even though it noted that all oil and
gas rights would have been accessible, albeit at a higher cost than
would otherwise have been applicable.148 The plaintiffs brought this
action asserting that the Plan essentially interfered with their right of
142. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Svc., 630 F.3d 431,
433-34 (5th Cir. 2011).
143. 16 U.S.C. §§ 459d to 459d-7 (2006).
144. Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 433.
145. Id. at 433.
146. Id. at 434. The State instructed the School Land Board to execute a deed
incorporating the provisions of the Consent Statute regarding the reserved express
easement of surface use. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The use of no surface occupancy provisions in leases is not uncommon for
federal lands in the western portion of the United States. See 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN
MINERAL LAW FOUND., LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES,

§

15.04

(LexisNexis

Matthew Bender 2011).
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ingress and egress for the purposes of developing the oil and gas resources located beneath the Seashore.14 9 The trial court held in favor
of the plaintiffs in part, finding that the "Consent Statute" applied to
protect the ingress and egress rights of the plaintiffs.'
While the National Park Service has broad powers granted to it
under its Organic Act, which is consistent with Congress's plenary
powers under the Property Clause, 1"' the plaintiffs argued that the
"Consent Statute," by which Texas authorized the Service to purchase
surface interests, restricted the Service's ability to impact their mineral estates and their express and/or implied easement of surface use.
In interpreting various provisions of the "Consent Statute," the court
found that the protections contained therein for mineral owners only
apply to private mineral owners, or their successors in interest, who
conveyed the surface estate to the Service.' 5 2 Applying the plain
meaning canon of statutory construction, the court found the express
reference to a grantor or its successor in interest required a grant or
conveyance before the surface easement protections were triggered.'5
It was undisputed that the plaintiffs, like most mineral owners, only
owned the severed mineral estate at the time that title to the surface
of the Seashore was purchased or condemned by the Service.154 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that another canon of statutory construction applied, namely that the plain meaning should not be given
effect where it would lead to an absurd result, because having a checkerboard pattern for those mineral interests which were protected by
the "Consent Statute" and those which were not was not an absurd
result.15 5
In dealing with the plaintiffs' next claim that their severed mineral
estates were outside of the boundaries of the Seashore and thus had
their easements of surface use protected by virtue of the Enabling
Act, the court wreaked havoc with some traditional principles of
Texas oil and gas jurisprudence. According to the plaintiffs, when the
Service purchased the surface estate, it did not impact the separate
ownership of the plaintiffs in the mineral estates, and thus the mineral
estates were outside of the Seashore's boundaries. The Fifth Circuit
said:
149. Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 434-45. Plaintiffs had filed an earlier action
seeking to overturn pre-Plan regulations impacting the surface use of Service lands
for mineral exploitation purposes. That action was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Dunn McCampbell Royalty Interests, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 964
F.Supp. 1125, 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997).
150. Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 435.
151. See generally Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
152. Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 439.
153. Id. at 438.
154. Id. at 438-39.
155. Id.
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Although it is true that [the plaintiffs] own mineral estates beneath
the Seashore's surface, the conveyance of mineral rights ownership
does not convey the entirety of the sub-surface. As the Texas Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he minerals owner is entitled, not to the
molecules actually residing below the surface, but to a fair chance to
recover the oil and gas . . . ." Coastal Oil and Gas Corp. v. Garza

Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2008). In other words, if there
are no minerals beneath the surface of the Seashore, Dunn-McCampbell owns the legal fiction of an estate that is nothing. 156
The notion that the owner of the mineral estate does not own a
corporeal or possessory interest in the oil and gas beneath the surface
has not existed in Texas since at least 1915.157 The quotation from
Coastal Oil is especially troublesome because it opens up the theoretical conundrum of reconciling the rule of capture and the absolute
ownership theory that had been put to rest nearly a century ago. The
Fifth Circuit stated that when the minerals were severed, the surface
owners retained everything else so that when the Service purchased
the surface estates, it purchased everything but the mineral estate,
which is seemingly nothing more than the power to search for and
produce the minerals, if any, that underlay the surface. 5 8 That conclusion would have significant ramifications for other current issues
including who owns the underground strata for purposes of natural
gas storage or carbon sequestration. 1 5 9 The court seemingly confuses
a mineral owner's express or implied easement of surface use, which is
appurtenant to the corporeal mineral estate, with the corporeal mineral estate itself.16 0
156. Id. at 441.
157. See generally Tex. Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915) (recognizing the
ownership-in-place theory for oil and gas in Texas); Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kansas Oil
& Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923); Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W.
296 (Tex. 1923); A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil
and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1928) (noting that Texas followed the
ownership in place doctrine regarding a landowner's title to oil and gas).
158. Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 442.
159. See generally Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the
Pore Space?, 9 Wyo. L. REV. 97 (2009); Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for
Carbon SequestrationFrom Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 211 (2008); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, & Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (2010); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Marie Bradshaw
Durrant, State and Regional Control of Geological Carbon Sequestration (Part1), 41
ENVTL. L. REP. 10348 (2011).
160. See Dunn-McCampbell, 630 F.3d at 442. A mineral owner in Texas has either
an implied or express easement of surface use that is appurtenant to the mineral estate. A mineral owner may go onto the surface estate and explore for minerals
whether or not there are any minerals located thereon. Even where an area has been
determined to be bereft of oil and gas molecules, the mineral owner still owns a separate and independent mineral estate that does not magically re-unite with the surface
estate. While the mineral estate may have no economic value, it is still a separate
property interest.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss3/21
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V18.I3.20

28

Kramer: Texas

2012]

TEXAS

655

Because it concluded that none of the relevant statutory provisions
limited the National Park Service's power to regulate surface use for
mineral extraction purposes, the court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded for entry of judgment in
favor of the Service. 16 1
VIII. THE EXECUTIVE POWER
A. Lesley v. Veterans Land Board
In Lesley v. Veterans Land Board,162 the Texas Supreme Court was
asked to make some sense out of its somewhat confusing jurisprudence regarding the relationship between the owner of the executive
power and the owner of a non-executive interest.163 In 1952 the
Hedricks owned the unified fee simple absolute estate in some 4,100
acres in Erath County.164 They conveyed all of the surface, 1/ of the
mineral estate, and 100% of the executive power to the Fosters.165
The plaintiffs succeeded to the Fosters' interest and in 1998 conveyed
their interest to Bluff Dale Development Corp. for about $2 million,
reserving an undivided 'h mineral interest in the "minerals to which
Grantors are now entitled. .. "166 Bluegreen Southwest One L.P. is a
successor in interest to Bluff Dale, receiving 100% of the surface estate, a portion of the mineral estate, and 100% of the executive power.
Bluegreen began a residential subdivision development on the premises and included within its deeds to lot purchasers a declaration of
covenants, conditions, and restrictions, one of which prohibited the
161. Id. at 442-43. In a roughly analogous situation involving national forests in
the Eastern United States which were only annexed to the Forest Service in the early
part of the 20th Century and which typically did not involve purchase or condemnation of the severed mineral estate, the Third Circuit has found that surface use regulations impacting the mineral estate or imposing NEPA-type requirements on mineral
owners seeking to use the surface estate was ultra vires. See Minard Run Oil Co. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., Nos. 10-1265, 10-2332, 2011 WL 4389220 (3rd Cir. Sept. 20, 2011).
162. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. (Lesley II), 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1705, 2011 WL
3796568 (Tex. Aug. 26,2011). The Author wrote an amicus brief in favor of the Texas
Supreme Court's granting of the petition for review in this case and participated in
some conversations with the attorneys representing Lesley prior to oral argument.
The Author was not compensated for his work on this matter.
163. The Author uses the term executive "power" rather than the term executive
"right" since the ability to lease another's interest is much more akin to a classic
Hohfeldian and Restatement of Property "power" than it is to a "right." The Author
acknowledges that he is swimming upstream on this issue since the courts and the
commentators almost universally refer to the executive right. In fact the Williams and
Meyers treatise which the author has co-authored since 1996 uses the term "Executive
Right" to describe the analysis of the executive power. PATRICK H. MARTIN &
BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw, §§ 338-340.1 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2011).
164. See Veteran's Land Bd. v. Lesley (Lesley 1), 281 S.W.3d 602, 608 (Tex. App.Eastland 2009), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, Lesley II, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1705, 2011 WL
3796568 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
165. Lesley I, 281 S.W.3d at 608.
166. Id. at 609.
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use of the surface for commercial oil drilling, oil development, oil reMost of the deeds to the
fining, or mining operations of any kind.'
lot owners excepted the /4mineral interest owned by the plaintiffs but
did not specifically reserve the remaining mineral interest and were
silent on who owned the executive power.168 In 2008, the plaintiffs
who owned the non-executive mineral interests underlying the 4,100
acres sued Bluegreen and the individual lot owners, which includes
the Veterans Land Board, asserting that the restrictive covenants limited the development of their mineral interests.
The key issues relating to the executive power include: who owned
the executive power at the time the litigation commenced, and
whether the duty owed by the executive to the non-executive encompasses actions taken other than the actual execution of a lease.169 On
the issue of whether the Veterans Land Board was entitled to immunity, the Court had no problem finding that the plaintiffs' action involved a suit to determine the ownership of the Board's property
interest, from which it was clearly immune.170
The plaintiffs had brought a claim for reformation based on the
Lesley/Bluff Dale deed, which had reserved "one-fourth (1/4) of the oil

... and other minerals to which Grantors are now entitled .... "171
The deed then reserved to the Grantor '/4 of all bonuses and delay
rentals.172 The Lesley plaintiffs argued that the parties intended that
the grantors reserve a /4mineral interest and not a 1/4 of 1/, or '/8, mineral interest as evidenced by the reservation of a full /4 of the bonus
and delay rentals. They alleged mutual mistake as the basis for the
reformation. The trial court granted the Lesley plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment on the reformation claim, but the court of appeals
reversed.1 73 The issue was whether the four-year statute of limitations
had run on the reformation cause of action. Where the disputed language is not plain on its face and raises arguable questions of fact,
such as with this deed-which had inconsistent signals between the
principal reservation clause and the reference to the bonus and delay
rentals reserved-it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the Lesley
plaintiffs should have known at the time of the conveyance the alleged
mutual mistake. Therefore, the reformation claim must be remanded
167. Id. at 608-09.
168. See id. at 609.
169. See generally In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003) (suggesting that the duty
owed by the executive to the non-executive only arises through the leasing of the
premises so that actions other than leasing are not subject to the duty); Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (same);
Hiavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)
(same).
170. Lesley II, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1705, 2011 WL 3796568, at *2-3 (Tex. Aug. 26,
2011).
171. Id. at *4.
172. Id.
173. Lesley I, 281 S.W.3d at 623-25.
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to the trial court to ascertain whether the statute of limitations should
have applied given the somewhat ambiguous language of the deed.17 4
Texas has been firmly committed to the doctrine that the mineral
estate is composed of five "essential attributes," to wit, the development right, the executive right, the right to receive bonus, the right to
receive delay rentals, and the right to receive royalty. 75 While this
approach has been widely used, albeit not with consistent results in
attempting to resolve the oft-times difficult question of whether the
parties granted or reserved a mineral or royalty interest, it is clear that
the five "attributes" are not essential since one can possess something
less than all five and still be labeled a mineral interest owner. 7 6 In
theory, at least, one should be able to convey or reserve any of the
five attributes independent of each other. In practice, however, since
most individuals do not consciously attempt to separate the development right and the executive power, the Texas Supreme Court has
come up with a default rule that treats the executive power as a correlative to the development right, which has the effect of lowering the
number of "essential attributes" from five to four.' 77 The default rule
applied in this case where the deed to the individual lot owners conveyed the mineral interests not previously reserved. Since the deeds
did not specifically mention the executive power, or the other attributes, the executive power was conveyed to the individual lot owners
subject to the restrictive covenant prohibiting mineral development. 7 8
Part of the confusion arising from attempts to define the scope of
the duty owed to the non-executives by the executive has been the
intrusion of "fiduciary duty" language into the lexicon. It was Manges
v. Guerra that transformed what had been the prior standard of "utmost good faith and fair dealing" into a fiduciary standard.17 9 But as
courts and commentators have noted, it is clear that the standard described in Manges is not the classic, self-sacrificing fiduciary duty that
applies to trustee/beneficiary and attorney/client relationships."8 o Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court reinforced its prior holdings
that the executive owes a fiduciary duty to the non-executive while at
the same time noting that in the context of the executive/non-executive situation, the self-sacrificing standard of conduct is probably not
174. Lesley II, 2011 WL 3796568, at *4 (relying on the principal reformation case
Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980)).
175. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986).
176. See French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Tex. 1995).
177. Day & Co., Inc. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1990).
178. Lesley II, 2011 WL 3796568, at *5.
179. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984).
180. See Marrs & Smith P'ship v. D.K. Boyd Oil & Gas Co., 223 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 163, § 339.2; Ernest E. Smith, Implications of Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the
Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1985).
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required of the executive.'"" The Court repeated its narrow definition
of the executive's alleged "fiduciary" standard: that the executive not
obtain benefits for itself that are not shared with the non-executive.18 2
Thus we are left with the same conundrum we faced before Lesley,
namely that there are two fiduciary duties alive and well in Texas: the
traditional one relating to principallagent, trustee/beneficiary and attorney/client relationships; and the more limited one relating to the
executive/non-executive relationship.
The other issue facing the Court was whether or not the duty owed
by the executive includes a duty to actually execute a lease or refrain
from actions that might otherwise injure the non-executive interest.
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in In re Bass,' in the minds of
many, including two courts of appeal' 8 4 and the court of appeals in
this case,' 8 read Bass as precluding the existence of any duty except
when the executive actually executes a lease. The Court, without distinguishing Bass except to say that in Bass there was no expectation of
any leasing, concluded:
[W]e do not agree with Bluegreen and the land owners that Bass
can be read to shield the executive from liability for all inaction. It
may be that an executive cannot be liable to the non-executive for
failing to lease minerals when never requested to do so, but an executive's refusal to lease must be examined more carefully. If the refusal is arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to the non-executive's
detriment, the executive may have breached his duty. 186
The Court found that its newfound duty was not implicated in this
case because, by imposing restrictive covenants upon the sale of the
subdivided lots, the executive did the same thing that the executive
was doing in Manges when it executed a deed of trust secured by both
the executive and non-executive's mineral estates. Just as the Court
cancelled the deed of trust as to the non-executive mineral interest in

181. Lesley II, 2011 WL 3796568, at *9. The fiduciary duty language has become
endemic in Texas court of appeals decisions. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 163,
§ 339.2. The fiduciary duty standard for the executive has also been referred to in
HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 888 (Tex. 1998) and Andretta v. West,
415 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1967).
182. Lesley II, 2011 WL 3796568, at *9.
183. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
184. Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 S.W.3d 373, 376-77 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412, 419-20 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
185. Lesley I, 281 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009) aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1705, 2011 WL 3796568 (Tex. Aug. 16, 2011).
186. Lesley II, 2011 WL 3796568 at *9. To the extent the Aurora Petroleum and
Hiavinka deny the existence of a potential duty to execute a lease, those decisions are
disapproved.
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Manges, the Texas Supreme Court cancelled the restrictive covenant
in this case.m
While the Court's decision in Lesley reaches an appropriate result,
in my opinion, the Texas Supreme Court lost an opportunity to clear
up some of the loose ends that have plagued Texas courts in dealing
with the duty owed by the executive to the non-executive. The Court
could have repudiated the continued use of the term "fiduciary duty"
and still retained the basic standard of conduct that was reflected in
the earlier cases and in the Manges jury instruction. Instead, Texas
will retain two fiduciary duties. Likewise the Court could have partially overruled Bass to the extent that it holds that there is never a
duty to lease, as it did with the two court of appeals decisions it disapproved of. Instead, it did a poor job of distinguishing Bass, so it still
may be cited as good law for the proposition that if the parties are not
contemplating leasing, whether or not an offer to lease has been
made, there may be no breach of the duty owed to the non-executive.
187. Id. Clearly the residential lot owners have lost an important property interest
by having the no drilling covenant canceled. The Court gives solace to them by saying
that under the reasonable accommodation doctrine, the mineral owner's implied easement of surface use will have to consider the impact on the surface owner before
engaging in surface disturbing activities. The Court appears to be replacing a whole
loaf of bread with a slice.
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